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INTRODUCTION
The question presented in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC was whether a schoolteacher should be
considered a minister.1 Although the schoolteacher in this case, Cheryl
Perich, began her employment as a lay teacher, she soon became a called
teacher with the title “commissioned minister.”2 She taught a religion class
four times a week and led her class in daily prayers.3 During the bulk of her
workday, however, Perich taught math, reading, English, social studies,
science, gym, art, and music to third and fourth graders.4
Perich claimed that the school retaliated against her in violation of the
Americans with Disability Act (ADA). During the summer of 2004, Perich
became seriously ill.5 She took disability leave when school started in the
fall and was eventually diagnosed with narcolepsy.6 In January 2005, Perich
informed the school principal that her doctor had cleared her to return to
work.7 In response, the principal voiced concerns about the safety of
students under Perich’s care.8 The school board then expressed its opinion
that Perich would not be physically capable of returning to work and
requested that she resign in exchange for assistance with her health
insurance.9 Perich declined the offer.10 Her doctor released her to return to
work on February 22, 2005, effectively ending her disability coverage.
When Perich reported for work on February 22, the school did not have a
1

131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-553).
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
3
Id.
4
Id. Teaching these subjects occupied all but forty-five minutes of each seven-hour day. Id. at 772.
In teaching these classes, she used the same textbooks as were used in public schools. Id. at 773.
5
Id. at 773.
6
Id. (“Throughout her leave, Perich regularly provided [the principal] with updates about her
condition and progress.”).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 774.
10
Id.
2
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job for her.11 Because the school handbook stated that failure to return to
work the day after an approved medical leave expires may be considered a
voluntary termination, Perich refused to leave school grounds without a
letter acknowledging she had appeared for work.12 After Perich told the
principal that she would sue for disability discrimination, she was fired.13
Correspondence from the school indicated that she lost her job because she
was insubordinate and threatened to take legal action.14 Under the ADA, it
is illegal for an employer to retaliate against an employee for bringing or
threatening to bring a disability discrimination suit.15
The success of Perich’s ADA claim turned on whether the Supreme
Court thought that she was a minister. If she was not a minister, she would
have probably won. After all, the school stated in writing that a main reason
for Perich’s termination was her threatened lawsuit. But because the
Supreme Court decided that she was a minister, and that ministers may not
sue their religious employers for discrimination under the ministerial
exception, she lost.16
Hosanna-Tabor marks the first time the Supreme Court has recognized
the ministerial exception. The ministerial exception grants religious
organizations immunity from employment discrimination suits by ministers
even if the discrimination is not religiously required.17 Thus, even if the
tenets of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church forbid
discrimination on the basis of disability—and in fact their Governing
Manual for Lutheran Schools states that the school will not discriminate on
these grounds18—ministers cannot sue the school for disability
discrimination. The lower courts, which created and uniformly apply the
ministerial exception, claimed that the First Amendment’s religion clauses
require it.19 The Supreme Court agreed.20 Interfering with clergy–
employment decisions would undermine the church autonomy guaranteed
11

Id.
Id.
13
Id. at 774–75.
14
Id. According to a March 19, 2005 letter from the school board, the school board was going to
request that her call be rescinded because of her “insubordinat[e] and disruptive behavior” on the day
she reported back to school, and because she had “damaged, beyond repair” her working relationship
with the school by “threatening to take legal action.” Id. at 774 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006).
16
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 708 (2012).
17
See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying the ministerial
exception even though the Salvation Army never claimed the alleged discrimination was religiously
mandated).
18
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 782 (“[T]he LCMS personnel manual, which includes EEOC policy,
and the Governing Manual for Lutheran Schools clearly contemplate that teachers are protected by
employment discrimination and contract laws.”).
19
See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007); McClure, 460
F.2d at 560.
20
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702.
12
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by the Free Exercise Clause, and adjudicating these suits would lead to
entanglement with religious doctrine and therefore violate the
Establishment Clause.21
The Supreme Court is mistaken. Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor
the Establishment Clause required the Hosanna-Tabor Court to endorse the
ministerial exception. As a neutral law of general applicability, the ADA
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, trying to discern
whether Perich was a minister or not created more Establishment Clause
problems than simply resolving her retaliation claim would have.
I.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION

A. Employment Division v. Smith
The lower courts created the ministerial exception before Employment
Division v. Smith22 announced a major shift in free exercise jurisprudence.
Smith held that as long as a law is neutral and generally applicable, it does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it imposes a substantial burden
on religion.23 Smith itself upheld a law that made a religious sacrament
illegal.24 Because the ADA is both neutral and generally applicable, Smith
should have defeated any free exercise justification.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court summarily dismissed Smith in two
sentences: “Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical
acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with
an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself.”25
But the Court cannot mean to pin the difference on a physical act
versus a nonphysical act. It is not altogether clear what that even means.
Ritual use of peyote may amount to a physical act, but so does removing
someone from her job.

21
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption
from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1973–81 (2007) (explaining the origins,
development, and justifications for ministerial exception).
22
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23
494 U.S. at 879, 882–83.
24
Id. at 874 (1990) (recognizing that plaintiffs’ use of peyote was a sacrament in their Native
American Church); id. at 890 (denying plaintiffs an exemption from the Federal Controlled Substance
Act that made such sacramental use illegal). It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss whether Smith
was correctly decided. Perhaps exemptions that do not impose burdens on others ought to be required
under the Free Exercise Clause, although such a claim would have to explain why religious but not
equally strong secular moral commitments are protected. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER &
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (arguing that all deep
moral commitments should be treated equally). In any case, exemptions for religious employers from
antidiscrimination law clearly impose a significant burden on those seeking the protection of those laws.
25
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 697.
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Instead, the distinction seems to lie with the difference between
internal matters and external matters. The first problem with this distinction
is that the line between internal and external is far from self-evident.
Consuming peyote is an external matter in that it involves breaking a
neutral law of general applicability passed in order to promote public health
and safety. At the same time, fulfilling a religious sacrament, i.e., taking
peyote during a religious ritual, could just as easily be framed as an internal
matter, and an internal matter directly related to the church’s faith.
The second problem with this distinction is that it results in a free
exercise jurisprudence that provides more protection for religious
institutions than it does for religious individuals.26 The combination of
Smith and Hosanna-Tabor means that religious individuals have absolutely
no protection from neutral laws of general applicability, even if the laws bar
them from participating in a sacrament (the Smith rule), while religious
institutions may be protected absolutely, even if their acts have no religious
basis (the ministerial exception approved by Hosanna-Tabor).27
The third problem is that protection for “internal church decisions”
relies on a misreading of the Court’s earlier church property cases. In
defending “church autonomy” in matters of internal governance, the
Supreme Court pointed to a line of church property cases where the Court
deferred to the church hierarchy.28 From these cases the Court concluded
that it should likewise defer to church employers when it comes to
employment discrimination suits involving their ministers.29 A minister,
after all, “serves as the church’s public representative, its ambassador, and

26

Individual challenges to neutral laws of general application will never involve “internal church
decisions”—only institutional ones will. Reasoning along these lines, the lower courts have argued that
Smith applies only to individual free exercise claims and not to institutional ones. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). While religious associations, like other
associations, serve as mediating institutions between the government and the individual, associational
interests are already amply protected by the freedom of expressive association. See Corbin, supra note
21, at 1987–89.
27
Either way, the religious individual loses. The religious individual loses under Smith because her
religious practices need not be accommodated, no matter how deeply felt, so long as the law banning
them is neutral and generally applicable. The religious individual—the minister—loses again under the
ministerial exception because her religious employer does not have to abide by antidiscrimination law,
regardless of whether the discrimination or retaliation is religiously required.
28
See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
29
See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 184–88 (2011).
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its voice to the faithful.”30 Furthermore, the deference should be absolute, so
that in all discrimination cases, the minister loses.
Yet, animating the Court’s recognition of church autonomy in these
cases was the Establishment Clause concern that the state would entangle
itself in theological or doctrinal controversies.31 The Establishment Clause
bars the courts from resolving theological or doctrinal disputes or endorsing
one version of religious truth over another.32 The state is considered
incompetent in these religious matters. For example, in Watson v. Jones,33
the Supreme Court rejected the English rule of awarding contested property
in church schisms to the faction the court finds represents the “true standard
of faith,” and instead deferred to church hierarchy on this religious
question.34 Similarly, in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia
law that required the courts to settle a property dispute between a general
church and breakaway local churches by deciding whether the general
church had departed from the religious tenets it held at the time the local
churches first affiliated with it.35 Entanglement concerns also explain the
holdings of the other cases mentioned in Hosanna-Tabor.36

30
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006); see also McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose.”).
31
See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment severely
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. Most
importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the
basis of religious doctrine and practice.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
32
Thus, as examples, the state cannot declare that Catholics practice the correct version of
Christianity or that the Catholic Mass is properly performed in Latin rather than English.
33
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
34
Id. at 727.
35
393 U.S. 440, 441, 449–50 (1968). In fact, the Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church did not
actually defer to the church hierarchy. See id. at 449–51.
36
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, the Supreme Court declined to rule on
whether the church properly applied its own policies. 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). Notably, the case did
not address the issue of the Court’s competence to rule on whether the church failed to abide by state
laws.
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, the Supreme
Court rejected the New York legislature’s finding that one faction would better carry out the church’s
mission and opted for deference to the highest church body. 344 U.S. 94, 106 n.10, 107–09, 117–18
(1952). The Hosanna-Tabor Court quoted Kedroff for the proposition that “‘[f]reedom to select the
clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,’ is ‘part of the free exercise of religion’
protected by the First Amendment” without acknowledging the caveat that the Free Exercise Clause
would not protect decisions involving “improper methods of choice.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Kedroff,
344 U.S. at 116). If “arbitrariness” (an improper method, see Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116) encompasses
improper discrimination, then this language does not support the absolute immunity of the ministerial
exception. Furthermore, the very fact that there are any caveats counsels against absolute immunity.
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In addition, reliance on this line of cases is misplaced because it
overlooks Jones v. Wolf,37 the last church property dispute decided by the
Supreme Court. Despite being the most recent case involving internal
church governance, the Hosanna-Tabor Court completely ignored it.38 It
had to, since Jones explicitly rejected blanket deference to religious
institutions.39
B. Jones v. Wolf
Like previous church property disputes, Jones involved a schism
within a church. A majority of the Vineville Church in Macon, Georgia,
voted to separate from the Presbyterian Church in the United States
(General Church).40 Both the majority congregation and the minority that
wished to remain affiliated with the General Church claimed the church
property as their own.41
The Supreme Court rejected a rule requiring it to defer to the church
hierarchy of the General Church42: “We cannot agree, however, that the
First Amendment requires . . . a rule of compulsory deference to religious
authority in resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of
doctrinal controversy is involved.”43
Instead, the Supreme Court endorsed a neutral principles of law
approach: “We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to
adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property
dispute.”44 In other words, the Court endorsed settling the church’s property
dispute in the same way that it would settle the property dispute of a secular
organization. Thus, a court could “examine[] the deeds to the properties, the
state statutes dealing with implied trust[], and the Book of Church Order to

37

443 U.S. 595 (1979).
In addition to misreading the church property cases, the claim that Employment Division v. Smith
applies only to individual and not institutional free exercise claims also overlooks the general shift in
religion clause jurisprudence—a shift that Smith embodies—towards more equal treatment of religion
and nonreligion. See Corbin, supra note 21, at 1990–96.
39
Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional
Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 293–95 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption and Religious and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 391, 407 (1987).
40
Jones, 443 U.S. at 598.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 604–05 (“The dissent . . . would insist as a matter of constitutional law that whenever a
dispute arises over the ownership of church property, civil courts must defer to the ‘authoritative
resolution of the dispute within the church itself.’”).
43
Id. at 605; accord id. at 602 (“[T]he First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a
particular method of resolving church property disputes.”).
44
Id. at 604.
38
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determine whether there was any basis for a trust in favor of the general
church.”45
The Jones Court understood that Establishment Clause issues may
arise under a neutral principles of law approach.46 Nonetheless, the Jones
Court approved a neutral principles of law approach so long as “it involves
no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of
worship or the tenets of faith.”47 Thus, the possibility that Establishment
Clause issues may surface under a neutral principles of law approach does
not preclude its use. Perhaps that bears repeating: just because an
Establishment Clause issue may arise in the adjudication of a particular type
of claim does not mean a court must forever abandon trying to resolve such
a claim using neutral principles of law.48
Furthermore, the Jones Court recognized that a deference approach
does not eliminate all Establishment Clause problems. When church
structure is ambiguous, determining which unit of the church governance
has ultimate control might well result in entanglement with church
doctrine.49 In that case, it is actually the neutral principles of law approach
that can best avoid entanglement because it “obviates entirely the need for
an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine.”50
In short, controlling precedent did not require a rule of deference to the
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in this internalgovernance dispute. The Supreme Court could have resolved this retaliation
claim in much the same way courts resolve any other retaliation claim. Only
if adjudication of a claim entangles the court in theological or doctrinal
questions should the courts opt for deference to church authorities. This
conclusion is especially true because, as Jones acknowledges, a deference
approach might actually cause more Establishment Clause ills than a neutral
principles of law approach.

45
Id. at 600 (citation omitted). In other words, the Court expressly contemplated that the courts
would look at religious documents like a church constitution for language of trust. Id. at 604.
46
See id. at 604 (“This is not to say that the application of the neutral-principles approach is wholly
free of difficulty. . . . If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require
the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the
doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”).
47
Id. at 602.
48
Id. at 604 (“On balance, however, the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the
neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in
application.”).
49
See id. at 605.
50
Id.
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II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION
A. Neutral Principles of Law Approach: Resolving the Retaliation Claim
Supporters of the ministerial exception retort that resolving
discrimination claims violates the Establishment Clause because their
adjudication invariably requires courts to evaluate a minister’s spiritual
qualifications or determine whether a minister sufficiently embodies the
church and its teachings.51 But even assuming that some employment
discrimination cases might present these Establishment Clause problems,
not all do. Perich’s claim did not. Consequently, the Establishment Clause
cannot justify the blanket immunity that the ministerial exception provides.
It is incorrect to assume that adjudicating ministers’ antidiscrimination
claims will require courts to decide questions beyond their institutional
competence. A court could have easily resolved Perich’s retaliation claim
without becoming entangled with doctrinal or theological questions. In
order to win her retaliation suit, Perich would have had to prove that (1) she
engaged in activity protected by the ADA, (2) she suffered a materially
adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action.52
Perich’s protected activity was the assertion of her legal rights under
the ADA, and the adverse action was her termination. As in most retaliation
cases, the pivotal question was whether the assertion of her legal rights
caused her termination.53 It is uncontested that the school sent her a letter
stating that the school board intended to fire her because her threatened
legal action ruined her working relationship with the school.54 Thus, unlike

51

See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1593, 1613; see also Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that the
court could not “imagine an area of inquiry less suited to a temporal court for decision [than] evaluation
of the ‘gifts and graces’ of a minister” (alteration in original) (quoting Minker v. Balt. Annual
Conference United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2414707, at *14 (“The Establishment Clause also
prevents the courts from deciding the religious questions that are inevitably involved in employment
disputes over ministers.”).
52
See, e.g., Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 516 (6th Cir. 2009); Bryson v. Regis Corp.,
498 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir. 2007).
53
Case law is unclear as to whether Perich needs to prove that retaliation was the but-for cause, or
merely one cause, of her termination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified that discrimination need
only be a motivating factor for liability under Title VII. Lower courts differ about whether this standard
applies to suits under the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes. Compare Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying the “but-for” standard to an ADA claim),
with Martin v. Cal. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the
“motivating factor” standard to an ADA claim).
54
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 774 (6th Cir.
2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
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most cases, Perich had direct evidence of retaliation.55 As the Sixth Circuit
concluded, “contrary to Hosanna-Tabor’s assertions, Perich’s claims would
not require the court to analyze any church doctrine.”56
1. Main Religious Claim Is a Free Exercise Claim.—Hosanna-Tabor
nevertheless argued that there was a religious question because Perich was
fired for being insubordinate and spiritually unfit.57 She had been unruly and
disruptive when asserting her legal rights, thereby ruining her relationship
with the school.58 And instead of trusting the church’s mandatory dispute
resolution process, Perich sued in court.59 Of course, in a secular context,
firing someone for asserting her legal rights is the very definition of
retaliation and is illegal no matter how disruptive, insubordinate, or
infuriating the employer may find it. Moreover, any contract where the
employee has waived all rights to bring a discrimination claim against her
employer is void as against public policy.60 That is, a contractual provision
stipulating that all discrimination claims will be resolved internally, rather
than before a neutral third party, is unenforceable.61 Does the religious
context, however, transform the retaliation question into a religious
question, the resolution of which violates the Establishment Clause?
Hosanna-Tabor’s argument boiled down to this: a religious organization
should be able to proclaim ministers spiritually unfit anytime they assert
their legal rights or insist that the church follow the law, and for the secular
courts to disagree with this assessment violates the Establishment Clause.
55
The principal sent Perich a letter stating that due to her disruptive behavior on the day she
reported back to work, the board would request her termination. Id. The letter also stated that she had
“damaged, beyond repair” her working relationship with the school by “threatening to take legal action.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56
Id. at 781.
57
According to the school, Perich was fired “because her insubordination and threats of litigation
violated Church teaching.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Hosanna-Tabor, No. 10-533 (Oct. 22,
2011).
58
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774.
59
See id. at 782.
60
Employees may not by contract prospectively waive their civil rights:
[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title
VII. . . . Title VII’s strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each
employee be free from discriminatory practices. . . . [W]aiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
61
While employees may agree to bring civil rights claims before a neutral third party arbitrator
rather than in court, the agreement is valid only if “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 28, 30 (1991) (alteration in original) (allowing arbitration clauses of civil rights claims on the
assumption that the arbitrator will be “[a] conscientious and impartial arbitrator[]” and noting that the
applicable arbitration rules “provide protections against biased panels” (quoting Mitsubushi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (internal quotation mark omitted)). It is
doubtful that Hosanna-Tabor’s “internal dispute resolution” process would qualify as arbitration, much
less meet this standard.
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Again, a court could avoid all Establishment Clause issues and still
decide this retaliation claim. To be sure, the Supreme Court would have
violated the Establishment Clause if it had declared what the church’s true
beliefs were with regard to insubordination among its ministers. But the
Court could have assumed that, under tenets of the Missouri Synod—the
larger organization of which Hosanna-Tabor is a member church—
dissension can compromise a minister’s spirituality and even that it was
spiritual unfitness and not pique or financial considerations62 that motivated
Perich’s dismissal,63 and still hold that the church violated the law. How? In
claiming that Perich was spiritually deficient because she threatened legal
action, Hosanna-Tabor did not deny that her attempt to exercise her civil
rights resulted in her termination. Instead, the argument was essentially that
the retaliation was religiously mandated. Nonetheless, it was still an
admission of retaliation.
This defense raises free exercise concerns, not establishment ones. The
Court had to decide whether a neutral law of general applicability
(retaliation is illegal) superseded a religious obligation (retaliation is
religiously required). Under Employment Division v. Smith, as long as the
law is neutral and generally applicable, it does not matter if it substantially
burdens a religious practice.64
Of course, even before Smith, the fact that a law burdened a religious
tenet did not guarantee an exemption from that law.65 Even a significant
burden on a religious practice might be countenanced if the state’s interest
62

When Perich went on leave, the school hired a replacement for the rest of the year instead of a
more limited time frame. As a result, the school could not lay off the replacement if Perich were to
return. Thus, it was in its financial interest to terminate Perich.
63
This is a big assumption, and a court might well decide that the claim is merely pretext for
discrimination rather than sincere. This is the same determination courts regularly make in
discrimination claims. See Corbin, supra note 21, at 2016–22 (explaining why pretext analysis does not
require courts to become entangled in theological or doctrinal issues). For example, Perich might offer
evidence that another commissioned teacher threatened to sue for breach of contract yet did not lose his
job.
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton, 477 U.S. 619 (1986), a case that parallels this one, the
Supreme Court gave its blessing to a pretext analysis. In that case, a born-again Christian school told a
pregnant teacher she could not return to school the following year because of its belief that mothers
should stay home with their preschool children. Id. at 623. When she threatened litigation, the school
fired her for violating the mandatory internal dispute resolution provision in her contract, arguing that
Christians should not sue other Christians. Id. While the ultimate holding focused on abstention issues,
the Supreme Court noted that “the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating
the circumstances of [the schoolteacher’s] discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the
ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.” Id. at 628.
64
In effect, if it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause for the state to ban a sacrament, as it did
in Smith, then it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause for the state to regulate those who might
administer a sacrament. Although here, of course, Perich was not administering any sacraments, and the
issue before the Court was whether she should even be considered a minister.
65
For example, even if a church’s religious tenets required that insubordinate ministers be flogged,
courts are not likely to exempt it from criminal assault law.
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were compelling, and the means to achieve it narrowly tailored.66 In
approving the ministerial exception and its absolute protection for religious
institutions, the Supreme Court barely acknowledged the goals of
antidiscrimination law. The Hosanna-Tabor Court devoted a single
throwaway line at the very end of the opinion to the state’s interest: “The
interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes
is undoubtedly important.”67 Yet, in granting blanket immunity to HosannaTabor, the Court did not consider, much less balance, any countervailing
interests. Surely the right to equal protection and the right to a day in court
deserved more.
Furthermore, the Court’s acceptance of the school’s all-litigiousministers-are-spiritually-deficient argument suggests that religious
employers now have carte blanche to retaliate with impunity. A church may
be able to dismiss as insubordinate and spiritually unfit a minister who
threatens to sue after the church breaches its contract and fails to pay the
agreed-upon salary. A church may also be able to terminate without
interference a minister who helps a colleague file a sexual harassment
claim. Likewise, a church, religious school, or religious hospital may be
able to fire as insubordinate and spiritually unfit a minister who reports any
wrongdoing, whether it be discrimination, embezzlement, or the sexual
abuse of children.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court insists that its holding is limited to
terminations stemming from antidiscrimination claims.68 Even if so limited,
it still means that a minister cannot bring, or safely help anyone else bring,69
a sex, race, age, or disability discrimination suit. Moreover, the Court’s
reasoning is not so easily confined. If a church has an absolute right to

66

Courts have held that antidiscrimination laws trump religious views. For example, courts have
held that religious schools must comply with Title VII and the Equal Pay Act even though their religious
tenets regard married men as heads of households and require providing them with better health
insurance or salaries than married women. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362,
1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the state could require a school to violate religious tenets and provide
health insurance to married women as well as to singles and married men); EEOC v. Tree of Life
Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700, 716–17 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that the state could require a
school to violate religious tenets and pay married women the same compensation as married men); see
also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985) (holding that the
state could force a religious organization to violate its religious beliefs and pay minimum wage as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act).
67
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
68
Id. at 710 (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a
minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception
bars such a suit.”).
69
Because Hosanna-Tabor involves a minister litigating on her own behalf, it is possible that the
ministerial exception will not apply to ministers who help others pursue discrimination claims against
their church. See supra note 68. But cf. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203
F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (ministerial exception applied to minister demoted after helping colleague
with her sexual harassment claim).
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select its ministers, it is not clear why the result would be different if it
wished to fire a whistle-blower minister or a minister who brought a breach
of contract suit rather than a discrimination suit.70 In short, letting a
religious organization claim that any minister who insists on compliance
with the law is spiritually unfit creates a potentially limitless loophole and
allows it to be “a law unto itself.”71
2. Reinstatement Issue.—Although resolving Perich’s retaliation
claim does not raise Establishment Clause problems, perhaps remedying it
does. The Supreme Court frames reinstatement as foisting an “unwanted
minister” onto a church and “depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.”72 After all, how can a
minister be “an effective advocate for [a church’s] religious vision if that
person’s conduct fails to live up to the religious precepts that he or she
espouses[?]”73 Yet reinstatement does not necessarily distort a church’s
teachings. In fact, reinstatement itself is not inevitable.
As an initial matter, reinstating a previously appointed minister who
has won a discrimination suit is not the equivalent of the Crown imposing a
random government-selected official onto a church, as the Court described
when discussing the historical backdrop of the religion clauses.74 In
addition, some claims, such as Title VII sexual harassment claims and Fair
Labor Standard Act wage and hour claims, do not involve reinstatement or
require an evaluation of the plaintiff–minister’s “gifts and graces.” Because
these cases are unrelated to the church’s selection of its representatives and
control of its voice, they should not fall within the purview of the
ministerial exception. For just this reason, several lower courts have refused

70
Furthermore, although the Court explicitly stated it was not ruling on whether the ministerial
exception applies to breach of contract or tortious conduct claims brought by ministers, Hosanna-Tabor,
132 S. Ct. at 710, the scope of the reservation is unclear. Does it mean that the ministerial exception
does not apply to any action arising from a breach of contract/tort claim, including retaliation, so that a
church cannot fire a minister for bringing a breach of contract/tort claim, even if its religious tenets bar
suits against the church? Or does the ministerial exception only not apply to the underlying breach of
contract/tort claim while still foreclosing retaliation claims? If it is just the latter, then ministers still risk
retaliatory discharge for reporting wrongdoing by their religious employers. If it is the former, the Court
needs to explain why contract or tort law may trump a church’s religious beliefs, but not
antidiscrimination law.
71
Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also id. at 879 (arguing that granting
exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability “would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land” and would allow the religious observer “to become a law
unto himself”).
72
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
73
Id. at 713.
74
Id. at 702–03; see also id. at 702 (describing, as an example, a letter sent to a church wherein
Henry II wrote: “I order you to hold a free election, but forbid you to elect anyone but Richard my
clerk” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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to apply the ministerial exemption to sexual harassment cases.75 The same
should hold true for wage and hour claims.76
In any event, reinstatement only becomes an option when a minister,
chosen and endorsed by a church, has proven that she was terminated
because of her disability, race, sex, age, or in retaliation for raising a
discrimination claim. In most instances, the minister lost her job not
because of her own spiritual shortcomings, but because of the shortcomings
of a church decisionmaker.77 And if a minister was fired because of her
disability (or race or sex or age) and her church has no religious tenets
requiring dismissal of people due to disability (or race or sex or age), then
letting her resume her post does not undermine any religious tenet or
message. In other words, a minister who has proven that she lost her
position due to discrimination does not present a case where a minister
cannot represent her church and its teachings. Indeed, if discrimination
distorted the decisionmaking process, then reinstatement would merely
correct a church mistake.78
It can be argued that Perich’s retaliation case is the exception to the
rule that reinstatement rarely compromises any religious values because,
according to the Missouri Synod, the very act of suing the church
contravenes religious doctrine. In unusual cases, where there is no doubt
that the minister had violated a religious tenet, a compromise position might
be to limit the remedy to damages.79 In fact, this alternative remedy is
already available in secular employment discrimination cases where
reinstatement is not feasible.80
In addition to damages as an alternative remedy to reinstatement, there
may be constitutional protection for the church–clergy relationship, often
described as the “lifeblood” of the church. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
which allowed the Boy Scouts to violate antidiscrimination law on the
grounds that the presence of a gay scoutmaster would undermine the Boy
Scouts’ anti-homosexual message,81 strengthened the First Amendment
75

See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc. 369 F.3d 797, 805 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he requirement that the Hebrew Home pay
employees, like Shaliehsabou, overtime does not require the government—or the court—to question the
Hebrew Home’s religious beliefs, inquire into the religious nature of the activities that Shaliehsabou
performs, or to become involved in any way in the governance or functioning of the institution.”).
77
In a case where a minister has successfully proven discrimination, the fault lies with the
discriminatory decisionmaker, not the victim of that discrimination.
78
Reinstatement might actually benefit the church by restoring to it someone it would have
employed but for unsanctioned discrimination. See Corbin, supra note 21, at 2023.
79
This alternative remedy should be used sparingly.
80
See, e.g., Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846–37, 850 (2001). It was
also the remedy Perich was actually seeking in the Supreme Court. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012).
81
530 U.S. 640, 653–56 (2000).
76
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freedom of association guaranteed by the Free Speech Clause. Like other
associations, churches have a free speech interest in selecting those who
represent and speak for them. Many of the concerns expressed by both the
majority and Justice Alito’s concurrence—particularly the worry that
reinstatement forces a religious institution to retain a minister whose
presence undermines its messages82—sound in freedom of association,83 and
religious associations are as protected as any other association. However,
unlike the ministerial exception, protection under freedom of association is
not absolute. For Hosanna-Tabor’s decision to fire Perich to be protected to
the same degree as the Boy Scouts’ decision in Dale, Hosanna-Tabor would
have to establish that keeping Perich as a third- and fourth-grade teacher
would distort a religious message.84 Even then, the decision may still be
illegal if the Court determines that the antiretaliation law is sufficiently
tailored to advance a sufficiently important government interest.85
B. Church Deference Approach: Deciding Whether Perich Is a Minister
The irony of Hosanna-Tabor is that applying the ministerial exception
embroils the Court in theological or doctrinal disputes in a way that simply
resolving this retaliation suit does not. The case presents an example of how

82
Religions who limit their clergy positions to men may continue the practice on the grounds that
admitting women would undermine their religious messages about the nature of ministry or the proper
roles of men and women.
83
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (noting church’s need to “shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments”). In fact, Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by Justice Kagan, relied
heavily on freedom of association principles. Id. at 712–13 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurrence
argued that freedom of association protection “applies with special force with respect to religious
groups, whose very existence is dedicated to the collective expression and propagation of shared
religious ideals.” Id. at 712. However, the concurrence failed to explain why religious groups dedicated
to the expression and propagation of ideas deserve greater protection than secular groups dedicated to
the expression and propagation of ideas, other than to point to the Free Exercise Clause. Yet it is
precisely the scope of the Free Exercise Clause that is at issue. Furthermore, protecting the ideas and
expression of religious groups more than those of secular groups raises serious free speech issues. See,
e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308,
320 (1991) (“[A] constitutional preference for [religion] cuts at the heart of the central principle of the
Free Speech Clause—that every idea is of equal dignity and status in the marketplace of ideas.”).
84
To the extent that establishment issues may come up, they differ from those that arise in applying
the ministerial exception. To start, it is much more problematic to encounter an Establishment Clause
issue in applying the ministerial exception when the very reason for its existence is to avoid
Establishment Clause issues. In addition, the question asked in applying the ministerial exception—does
this person perform religiously important duties?—necessarily involves delving into religious doctrine
and beliefs. The questions asked in resolving a freedom of association claim—does the religious
employer have a religious message and does the presence of a particular employee distort that
message—do not involve delving into religious doctrine and beliefs, especially if the court is deferential
with regard to the first question.
85
Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 657–58 (balancing expressive associational interests against
antidiscrimination goals of public accommodation law).
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a church autonomy or deference approach presents more Establishment
Clause problems than a neutral principles of law approach does.
To trigger the ministerial exception, the plaintiff in a discrimination
suit must be deemed a “minister.” In determining who counts as a minister,
courts cannot simply accept the religious employer’s characterization of a
position, as it could insist that all of its employees were ministers.86 Lower
courts applying the ministerial exception took a functional approach to the
question.87 Although the Supreme Court declined to enunciate a clear rule,88
it considered Perich’s title, its significance, and whether Perich performed
“important religious functions” for her Church.89
This query “necessarily requires the court to determine whether a
position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”90
This in turn contemplates some examination of the religious beliefs of the
religious organization. The very nature of the question—is this person a
“minister”?—invites courts to become entangled with theological and
doctrinal issues beyond their institutional competence.91
Teaching religion class and leading prayers are religious activities and
would readily qualify as religious duties. Yet these tasks only accounted for
approximately forty-five minutes out of Perich’s seven-hour work day—

86
See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (a school
claimed that all teachers “consider teaching to be their personal ministry”); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (a seminary claimed that all its employees,
including support staff, served a ministerial function).
87
See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f to
avoid having to pay the minimum wage to its janitor a church designated all its employees ‘ministers,’
the court would treat the designation as a subterfuge.”).
88
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”).
89
Id. at 708 (“In light of these considerations—the formal title given Perich by the Church, the
substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she
performed for the Church—we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by the ministerial
exception.”). Justice Alito’s concurrence favored a functional analysis: “[C]ourts should focus on the
function performed by persons who work for religious bodies.” Id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring).
90
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 722 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).
91
Some might argue that all religion clause cases necessarily require a threshold religious-orsecular inquiry in order to determine if the religion clauses even apply. That is not always true.
Sometimes the sole question in a free exercise challenge is whether a law is neutral and generally
applicable. Indeed, one of the reasons the Supreme Court adopted the Employment Division v. Smith rule
was to avoid making judgments about religion and religious doctrine. Moreover, the religious-or-secular
question is never the only question in other contexts. As a result, the Court can afford to be deferential in
those contexts. So, for example, in applying the Sherbert v. Verner test to laws that are not neutral and
generally applicable, see 374 U.S. 398 (1963), courts can assume that the law imposes a substantial
burden on a religious practice, yet still uphold the law if it passes strict scrutiny. Likewise, under the
Establishment Clause, there are also questions about history, purpose and effect, endorsement or
coercion. Because the religious-or-secular question may be dispositive when applying the ministerial
exception, courts must closely examine a religious tradition and its beliefs and decide whether someone
would be considered a minister within it.
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roughly 11% of her time. While the Court held that the Sixth Circuit placed
too much emphasis on the amount of time spent on religious activities,92
unless the Court is willing to categorize anyone who performs even one
religious task as a minister, it still has to draw the quantitative line
somewhere. Otherwise a school can make everyone a minister by ensuring
that each and every school employee, from the janitor to the bookkeeper to
the P.E. teacher, leads a prayer at least once or twice during the school year.
As a result, virtually no one who works for a religious school, hospital,
nursing home, social service organization, or church would have any
employment protections.
Perhaps anticipating this issue, the Hosanna-Tabor Court also pointed
to Perich’s title (commissioned minister) and its significance.93 Courts
cannot, however, rely on a title alone because, as Justice Alito’s
concurrence notes, some religions have no ministers and some consider all
their members to be part of their ministry.94 Accordingly, the HosannaTabor Court carefully detailed the requirements for becoming a
commissioned minister in the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. In
particular, the Court stressed that Perich had to take eight college-level
courses (which sounds like the equivalent of one year of full-time college),
pass exams, and be endorsed by her local Synod district.95 But does that
suffice to make her religiously important and therefore a “minister” within
the Missouri Synod? Pastors in the Missouri Synod must complete four
years of college study, and four additional years of graduate-level divinity
school.96 Furthermore, pastors are ordained. Ordination is “the historic and
apostolic rite by which, through Word and prayer, a man is set apart for
service to Christ and His church as a pastor.”97 Notably, the Missouri Synod
does not ordain women.98 The Missouri Synod is emphatic on this point99:
92

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09; see also id. at 709 (“The issue before us, however, is not
one that can be resolved by a stopwatch.”).
93
Id. at 707–08.
94
Id. at 713–14 (Alito, J., concurring).
95
Id. at 707.
96
For example, it takes four years to earn a Masters of Divinity, described as “the normative route
to certification for ordained ministry,” at Concordia Seminary, Master of Divinity, CONCORDIA
SEMINARY, http://www.csl.edu/admissions/academics/mdiv (last visited June 1, 2012), and longer if
admitted students cannot demonstrate entry-level competence in Old Testament, New Testament,
Christian doctrine, and Biblical Greek, Curriculum, CONCORDIA SEMINARY, http://www.csl.edu/
admissions/academics/mdiv/curriculum (last visited June 1, 2012) (noting that “aquir[ing] these
competencies can add as much as one additional year of academic residence”). Concordia Theological
Seminary has similar requirements. See Degree Requirements, CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
http://www.ctsfw.edu/Page.aspx?pid=392 (last visited June 1, 2012).
97
A.L. Barry, What About . . . Pastors, LUTHERAN CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD, http://www.
lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=1094 (last visited June 1, 2012).
98
See A.L. Barry, What About . . . The Ordination of Women to the Pastoral Office, LUTHERAN
CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD, http://www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=1099 (last visited June
1, 2012); see also Brief of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod as Amicus Curiae in Support of
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Women cannot administer the Sacraments nor can they preach the Word.100
The Synod’s official position is that “The Lord teaches us through His
Word that women are not given the responsibility of serving the church as
pastors” and that “the ordination of women is contrary to the Word of
God.”101 Both men and women can serve God, but “Men have the divine
obligation to be the spiritual leaders of the church. Women are called to be
of assistance to men in this capacity.”102
In passing judgment on the “substance reflected in [Perich’s] title,”103
the Court necessarily addressed theological questions, and perhaps even
controversies, that are beyond its competence and authority. Within the
Missouri Synod, what is the religious significance of having one year of
religious training instead of at least four? What is the religious significance
of endorsement compared to ordination? Can any woman’s contribution be
deemed “ministerial” in a tradition that explicitly reserves church leadership
and the title of “Pastor” to men? More importantly, are the courts capable of
making these kinds of determinations? In concluding that Perich’s title
proves her position was important to the religious mission of the Missouri
Synod, the Supreme Court made a number of decisions about the beliefs
and practices of the Missouri Synod—including how the Synod ought to
view a “commissioned minister”—that it really has no business making.
Another possible argument supporting the Court’s conclusion is that as
a teacher (and commissioned ministers are often teachers),104 Perich served
as a Christian role model for her students and that was an activity she
performed all day, every day. If that were a religiously important function,
then perhaps she should count as a minister. “According to Perich, using
secular textbooks to teach secular subjects is a secular activity; but
Petitioner at 6, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470848, at *6 (explaining
that pastoral office is limited to men).
99
As Leslie C. Griffin points out, another irony of the ministerial exception is that women who
cannot be ordained ministers for purposes of church leadership become ministers when they bring civil
rights claims: “All these women who could not be ordained by their churches were made ministers by
the courts . . . .” Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1850–52 (2011); see also id.
at 1852 (“Although the Roman Catholic Church would never ordain [plaintiffs] Brazauskas or Petruska
within the church, the courts were persuaded by the church hierarchy to confer ministerial status on the
two women just long enough to dismiss their lawsuits.”).
100
Brief of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, supra note 98, at 4 (explaining the role of
pastors).
101
Barry, supra note 98. In support of its official position, the Missouri Synod quotes from the
Bible, including 1 Corinthians 14:33–34, 37 (“As in all churches of the saints, the women should keep
silence in the churches. For they are not permitted to speak, but should be subordinate, even as the law
says . . . what I am writing to you is a command of the Lord.” (omission in original)) and 1 Timothy
2:11–12 (“Let a women learn in silence with all submissiveness. I permit no woman to teach or to have
authority over men; she is to keep silent.”). Id.
102
Id.
103
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
104
Brief of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, supra note 98, at 6.
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according to the Church, the same activity is religious because all teachers
are required to serve as ‘fine Christian role models.’”105 But whether serving
as a role model is religiously important—not whether it is important in
general, but whether it is important to the Missouri Synod’s spiritual and
pastoral mission—is not a question courts should answer.106 In short, courts
should not decide what is or is not important to a church’s pastoral mission
or resolve a theological dispute about the religious role of commissioned
ministers or schoolteachers.
The need for courts to resolve theological disputes in applying the
ministerial exception is even more stark in other examples. What if Perich
only taught secular subjects? Or what if, instead of a schoolteacher for the
Evangelical Lutheran Church, she served as its music director? In order to
decide whether a music director is a minister, the Court would have to rule
on the religious significance of music in the Missouri Synod.107 Again,
applying the ministerial exception would force courts to decide whether
music is integral to a denomination’s worship services or important enough
that teaching it makes someone a minister. Resolving theological disputes
about the significance of music to worship is beyond the courts’
institutional competence, yet it is exactly the kind of decision that
application of the ministerial exception may require.108
CONCLUSION
People who wish to serve their God should not have to choose between
their calling and their civil rights. Yet, the ministerial exception essentially
strips ministers of protection against discrimination based on race,109 sex,110
age,111 and, as here, disability, and potentially leaves them outside the

105

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 57, at 16 (citation omitted); see also Dias v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-cv-00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (Mar. 29, 2012) (rejecting the
Catholic Church’s claim that a computer instructor at a Catholic school was a minister because she
served as a Catholic role model).
106
Cf. Corbin, supra note 21, at 2028 (discussing the distinction between deciding whether
something is religiously true and evaluating the credibility of religious reasons).
107
See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that “[music] serves a unique function in worship”).
108
One appeals court noted that “[t]he very invocation of the ministerial exemption requires us to
engage in entanglement with a vengeance.” Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th
Cir. 2005).
109
See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a Hispanic communications manager could not bring a Title VII national origin claim);
Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308–12 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (barring a Pastor of
Worship Arts—a music director—from bringing a § 1981 claim).
110
See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a college chaplain
could not bring a Title VII sex discrimination claim).
111
See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a music director could not bring an ADEA claim).
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shelter of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA),112 the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),113 the Equal Pay Act,114 and a host of other
protective employment laws.115
This absolute immunity from lawsuits cannot be justified by either the
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. The ADA is a neutral
law of general applicability and therefore does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause, regardless of any religious burden it may impose on the HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School—though it is not at all
certain that compliance with the ADA burdens the school.116 In addition, to
the extent that Perich’s case raised Establishment Clause problems, it was
the Court’s deciding whether she is a minister that raised such problems,
not deciding whether the school retaliated against her.
Jones v. Wolf had outlined a better approach: apply employment
discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it would be
applied to a secular employer. If a theological or doctrinal question arises,
defer to the religious institution on that issue. Notably, accepting the
employer’s answer to a theological question would not guarantee victory
for the religious employer. To start, if the religion condemns discrimination,
then applying antidiscrimination law does not impose a substantial burden.
Furthermore, even if the religion advocates discrimination or retaliation, the
government’s interest in protecting employees might outweigh the church’s.
For example, even if it violates religious tenets to pay ministers the
minimum wage, a religious school could still be required to obey the law.117
Consequently, religious tenets barring ministers from asserting their legal
rights would not automatically shield religious employers from liability if
112
Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help Roman Catholic Church, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-0404, 2005
WL 2455253, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2005) (holding that a director of music was precluded from
bringing an FMLA suit).
113
See, e.g., Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that a seminarian who performed maintenance work and assisted with mass could not
bring an FLSA claim); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding
that Salvation Army ministers who ran a rehabilitation center could not bring FLSA claims against their
employer for violating minimum wage and overtime requirements); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of
Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299, 307 (4th Cir. 2004) (barring a kosher supervisor of a Jewish nursing home
from bringing an FLSA claim).
114
See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a director of the Department of Religious Formation could not bring an Equal Pay Act
claim).
115
See, e.g., id. (holding that a director of the Department of Religious Formation could not bring a
Title VII hostile work environment claim); Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 543 F. Supp.
2d 594, 612 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (barring a professor from bringing breach of contract, fraud, and
promissory estoppel claims).
116
To the extent that reinstatement might be burdensome as a remedy, damages are available as an
alternative.
117
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985) (holding that the
state could force a religious organization to violate its religious beliefs and pay the minimum wage as
required by the FLSA).

970

106:951 (2012)

The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor

they terminate someone for doing so. On the contrary, Employment
Division v. Smith held that religion was no longer grounds for exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability. At the same time, the church’s
interests could prevail if compliance with antidiscrimination law
undermines a religious message; in that case, an institution’s right to
freedom of association might trump antidiscrimination law. Unfortunately,
by authorizing the absolute immunity of the ministerial exception, the
Supreme Court chose to tip the scales and protect religious institutions
instead of religious individuals in every case.
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